Abstract. In a game where both contestants have perfect information, there is a strict limit on how perfect that information can be. By contrast, when one player is deprived of all information, the limit on the other player's information disappears, admitting a hierarchy of levels of lopsided perfection of information. We turn toward the question of when the player with super-perfect information has a winning strategy, and we exactly answer this question for a specific family of lopsided-information games which we call guessing games.
Introduction
Suppose Alice and Bob are playing an infinite game together and Alice has no information at all about what moves Bob makes. Formally this means Alice is only permitted to use strategies which do not depend on Bob's moves. Under this strong restriction, a strategy for Alice is really just a fixed move-sequence: loosely speaking, she decides all of her moves before the game ever begins. This opens the possibility for Bob to have "better than perfect" information. At the highest extreme, we could allow Bob to know Alice's entire move-sequence before he even makes his first move. Between that and what is normally called "perfect" information, there is a hierarchy of possible perfection. If Bob has perfect information in the traditional sense [3] of the word, then for every move he makes, he obtains a single ∆ 0 fact about Alice's move-sequence. By contrast, we could allow that with every move he makes, one ∆ 1 fact is revealed to Bob, or one ∆ 2 fact, etc.
Suppose S ⊆ N N is a fixed subset of Baire space. The guessing game for S is as follows. Alice chooses a sequence f : N → N, which may or may not be in S. The fact that this is chosen in advance corresponds to Alice having no information about Bob's moves. Now Bob tries to "guess" (formally: play 1 or 0) whether or not f is in S. The terms of Alice's sequence are revealed to him one-by-one and he gets to revise his guess with each revelation, and he wins if his guesses converge to the correct answer, otherwise Alice wins. If Bob has a winning strategy, S is said to be guessable. In an earlier paper [1] , I demonstrated that S is guessable if and only if S ∈ ∆ 0 2 , the boldface pointclass of the Borel hierarchy. I will generalize this result to higher-order guessing games which correspond to one player having more and more lopsided information.
The way in which Alice is forced, by lack of information, to choose her moves before the game begins, bears some resemblance to an auxiliary game invented by Donald Martin [4] in which, at a certain point, one player plays a quasi-strategy and in so doing locks himself into always playing within that quasi-strategy.
Zeroth-Order Guessability
In this section I will formally introduce guessability. The basic definition does not clearly generalize to higher orders, so an equivalent definition will be proved (using some basic first-order logic) which generalizes more smoothly.
If any such G exists, we say S is guessable.
Lemma 2. Let S ⊆ N N . Suppose Alice and Bob are playing natural numbers, that Bob has perfect information (in the usual sense) but Alice has no information, and that Bob wins if either (1) Alice's move-sequence is in S and Bob's moves are eventually always 1, or (2) Alice's move-sequence is not in S, and Bob's moves are eventually always 0. Then Bob has a winning strategy if and only if S is guessable.
Proof. If Bob has a winning strategy, then define G(f (0), . . . , f (n)) to be the nth move Bob makes according to that strategy, assuming Alice's move-sequence begins with (f (0), . . . , f (n)). Conversely, if S is guessable, say with guesser G, a winning strategy for Bob's nth move is to play G(f (0), . . . , f (n)) where f (i) denotes Alice's ith move.
In [1] I showed that the guessable sets are precisely the ∆ 0 2 sets; this will also be a special case of a later theorem in the present paper.
I want to give an alternate characterization of guessability which will generalize more easily. This will require some technical machinery from basic logic.
Definition 3.
• By L max I mean the first-order language which has a constant symbol n for every n ∈ N; an n-ary function symbolw for every function w : N n → N; an n-ary predicate symbolp for every subset p ⊆ N n ; a special unary function symbol f ; and, for every function G :
• For any f : N → N, the structure M f for the language L max is defined as follows. It has universe N. It interprets n,w, andp in the obvious ways. It interprets f as f . And for every G :
• If φ is an L max -sentence and σ ∈ N <N , say that φ is determined by σ if for every f, g ∈ N N which extend σ, M f |= φ iff M g |= φ.
In the following lemma and all of the paper, by "quantifier-free" I really mean it: not even bounded quantifiers are allowed (by contrast, some authors take "quantifier-free" to mean "all quantifiers bounded").
Lemma 4.
If φ is a quantifier-free L max -sentence and f : N → N, then there is some k big enough that (f (0), . . . , f (k)) determines φ.
Proof. First, I claim that if t is an L max -term with no free variables then there is a k large enough that t
. This is a straightforward induction on the complexity of t. I omit most cases, but just for one example, suppose t is (G • f )(u 0 , . . . , u n ) where G : N n × N <N → N and where u 0 , . . . , u n are simpler terms. By induction, find k 0 , . . . , k n such that each u
as desired. From this, the lemma follows by induction on the complexity of φ.
The above lemma would still hold if we allowed bounded quantifiers, but the proof would be more complicated.
is a clopen subset of Baire space. If f : N → N and if φ is an L max -sentence, I will write f (φ) for the number
In other words, f (φ) = 1 if and only if f ∈ [φ].
Proposition 6. Suppose S ⊆ N N . Then S is guessable if and only if there exists a countable set Σ of symbols of L max , a listing φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . of all the quantifierfree sentences of L max ∩ Σ, and a function G : {0,
Proof. (⇒) Suppose S is guessable, say with guesser G 0 : N <N → N. Let Σ be the symbol-set containing f and n for every n ∈ N. Let φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . be any listing of the quantifier-free L max ∩ Σ sentences. Define G : {0, 1} <N → N as follows.
<N . Say a formula φ appears if φ = φ i for some i ≤ n and p i = 1. Find a maximum-length sequence (n 0 , . . . , n k ) such that for each i = 0, . . . , k, the formula f (i) = n i appears, and let G(p 0 , . . . , p n ) = G 0 (n 0 , . . . , n k ); if (n 0 , . . . , n k ) is not uniquely determined or no such nonempty sequence exists, let G(p 0 , . . . , p n ) = 0. I claim this witnesses the theorem's conclusion. Let f ∈ S. Since G 0 guesses S, find n 0 so big that ∀n ≥ n 0 , G 0 (f (0), . . . , f (n)) = 1. Since φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . is an exhaustive list, there is some k 0 so big that (φ 0 , . . . , φ k0 ) includes all the sentences I claim G guesses S. Suppose f ∈ S. By hypothesis, there is some k 0 such that ∀k ≥ k 0 , G 0 (f (φ 0 ), . . . , f (φ k )) = 1. By Lemma 4, we can find some j 0 such that φ 0 , . . . , φ k0 are all determined by (f (0), . . . , f (j 0 )). Then for any j ≥ j 0 ,
So for any such j, G(f (0), . . . , f (j)) = 1, as desired. The case f ∈ S is similar. Proof. If Bob has a winning strategy, let Σ and φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . be as dictated by that strategy. For any (p 0 , . . . , p n ) ∈ {0, 1} <N , let G(p 0 , . . . , p n ) be the move dictated by Bob's strategy assuming Bob is told that Alice's move-sequence satisfies φ i for each p i = 1 (i ≤ n) and ¬φ i for each p i = 0 (i ≤ n).
Conversely, suppose S is guessable. Let Σ, φ 0 , φ 1 , . . ., and G : {0, 1} <N → N be as provided by Proposition 6. A winning strategy for Bob is to choose Σ, φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . at the beginning, and then always play G(f (φ 0 ), . . . , f (φ n )) where f is Alice's move-sequence; he can do this using the information he is given.
Higher-Order Guessability
Proposition 6 provides a way to generalize guessability, giving us a foothold into a hierarchy of super-perfect information. The Σ n and Π n formulas of a language are defined inductively: Σ 0 = Π 0 = ∆ 0 is the set of quantifier-free formulas (bounded quantifiers not allowed); having defined Σ n and Π n , let
An L max formula is ∆ n+1 if it is equivalent (over all the models M f ) to some Σ n+1 formula and also to some Π n+1 formula of L max .
We say S is mth-order guessable if there exists a countable set Σ of L max -symbols, a listing φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . of all ∆ m sentences of L max ∩ Σ, and a function G : {0, 1}
<N → N such that for every f : N → N,
Thus, Proposition 6 can be restated as follows: "S ⊆ N N is guessable if and only if it is 0th-order guessable." Lemma 9. Modify the game in Corollary 7 by changing "quantifier-free" to "∆ m ". Then Bob has a winning strategy if and only if S is mth-order guessable.
Proof. Immediate.
The main theorem of the paper will be that mth-order guessability is equivalent to ∆ My interest in defining Borel sets by formulas in a powerful language, as in the following lemma, is partially influenced by Vanden Boom [5] pp. 276-277. In [2] I give a similar result using a weaker but slightly nonstandard language.
Proof. Write [f 0 ] for the collection of infinite extensions of a finite sequence
c where each f i1···in ∈ N <N (we can assume the f i1···in are nonempty). If n is odd, write
. . , i n ) be the length of f i1···in , minus 1. Define τ : (a 1 , . . . , a k ) = f i1···in , τ = 0 everywhere else. Then for any f : N → N, f extends f i1···in if and only if
So if n is even, then S is defined by the L max sentence • f )(x 1 , . . . , x n ,l(x 1 , . . . , x n ) 
And if n is odd, then S is defined by the L max sentence • f )(x 1 , . . . , x n ,l(x 1 , . . . , x n ) <N → N which will witness the mth-order guessability of S. I'll define G in terms of two functions µ, ν :
<N . Say that a sentence φ i appears if i ≤ n and p i = 1. Let µ(p 0 , . . . , p n ) be the minimum x ∈ N such that there is no y ∈ N such that ¬σ xy appears. Let ν(p 0 , . . . , p n ) be the minimum x ∈ N such that there is no y ∈ N such that τ xy appears. Finally, let G(p 0 , . . . , p n ) = 1 if µ(p 0 , . . . , p n ) < ν(p 0 , . . . , p n ) and let G(p 0 , . . . , p n ) = 0 otherwise.
I claim Σ, φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . , G witnesses the mth-order guessability of S. First, suppose f ∈ S. I must show lim n→∞ G(f (φ 0 ), . . . , f (φ n )) = 1. Since f ∈ S = ∪ i∈N ∩ j∈N D ij , we have f ∈ ∩ j∈N D ij for some i. So f ∈ D ij for every j. Thus M f |= σ ij for every j, and thus ¬σ ij cannot appear in the definition of µ(f (φ 0 ), . . . , f (φ n )) for any n. Thus µ is bounded above by i. I claim lim n→∞ ν(f (φ 0 ), . . . , f (φ n )) = ∞, which will show that ν is eventually always above µ and thus that G converges to 1. It is enough to let i ∈ N be arbitrary and show ν(f (φ 0 ), . . . , f (φ n )) = i for all n sufficiently large. Well, S c = ∪ i∈N ∩ j∈N E c ij , and f ∈ S c , so for any arbitrary i ∈ N, there is some j such that f ∈ E ij , whence M f |= τ ij . Thus, for any n large enough that φ 0 , . . . , φ n includes τ ij , τ ij appears in the definition of ν(f (φ 0 ), . . . , f (φ n )), so ν(f (φ 0 ), . . . , f (φ n )) = i. There is such a sufficiently large n, because τ ij is ∆ m .
A similar argument shows that lim Proof. Suppose S is mth-order guessable. There is a countable set Σ of L max symbols and a listing φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . of all the ∆ m sentences of L max ∩Σ, and a function G : {0, 1} <N → N which witnesses the mth-order guessability of S. For any f : N → N, f ∈ S if and only if G(f (φ 0 ), . . . , f (φ n )) is eventually always 1. Thus we can write In the proof of Proposition 14 we actually proved slightly more than we needed, which leads to an unexpected standalone corollary.
Corollary 16. If S = ∪ i∈N ∩ j∈N X ij = ∩ i∈N ∪ j∈N Y ij , where the X ij and Y ij are ∆ 0 n , 0 < n ∈ N, then there is a single family Z ij of ∆ 0 n sets such that S = ∪ i∈N ∩ j∈N Z ij = ∩ i∈N ∪ j∈N Z ij .
Proof. By Proposition 13, S is nth-order guessable. Proposition 14 gives Z ij .
Acknowledgements
I want to thank Amit K. Gupta, Steven VanDendriessche, Timothy J. Carlson, and Dasmen Teh for much useful feedback, and especially Mr. Gupta for catching some mistakes in an earlier draft.
